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INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR 
REGULATION 101: WHAT CORPORATIONS 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TREATIES 
PERTAINING TO WORKING YOUTH 
INTRODUCTION 
he decision in Roe v. Bridgestone Corp.1 has signaled that transna-
tional corporations2 (“TNCs”) that have sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the United States3 may be subject to liability in U.S. courts for 
international child labor violations committed abroad. This liability may 
arise under the Alien Tort Statute4 (“ATS”), which allows aliens to bring 
claims in U.S. courts for torts in violation of an international treaty or the 
law of nations.5 In Bridgestone, Liberian workers alleged6 that their cor-
porate employer7 at the Firestone rubber plantation near Harbel, Liberia,8 
encouraged or even required them to put their children to work in order 
to meet extremely high production quotas.9 At the plantation, children as 
young as six years old allegedly tapped raw latex from rubber trees, ap-
                                                                                                             
 1. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 2. As used in this Note, “transnational corporation” means a business entity that 
operates in at least two countries. Seventy-eight thousand TNCs and their 780,000 for-
eign affiliates account for one-third of world exports and the equivalent of ten percent of 
the world’s gross domestic product. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOP-
MENT, at xvi, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2007, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007). 
 3. See WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (hold-
ing that the forum state may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant that 
did not establish minimum contacts with the state). 
 4. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 5. Id. 
 6. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the ATS, Thirteenth Amendment, California 
law, and 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (a federal statute authorizing civil actions for criminal forced 
labor violations), but these claims were dismissed. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F.Supp. 2d at 
1024. 
 7. Bridgestone Corporation is headquartered in Japan and, along with its consolidat-
ed subsidiaries, is the world’s largest manufacturer of tires and rubber products. 
BRIDGESTONE GROUP, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 79 (2008). 
 8. Harbel, Margibi County is situated about thirty-seven miles from Monrovia, the 
capital of Liberia. U.N. MISSION IN LIBERIA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA’S RUBBER 
PLANTATIONS: TAPPING INTO THE FUTURE 20, 72–73 (2006). 
 9. According to the pleadings, workers at the Firestone plantation cut rubber trees 
with a machete to allow the raw latex to drip into cups mounted on the trees, collected the 
latex from the cups into buckets, and brought the latex to the collection location carrying 
two, seventy-five-pound buckets at a time. To earn a daily wage equivalent to $3.19, a 
worker must collect latex from 1125 trees. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F.Supp. 2d at 991, 
994. 
T
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plied pesticides to the trees without any protective equipment, and per-
formed other “back-breaking” work.10 The employer moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, but the court denied the motion and concluded 
that these allegations, if proven, may give rise to a violation of interna-
tional law.11 As the Bridgestone litigation continues, TNCs are con-
fronted with the need to identify international child labor standards so as 
to avoid liability. 
In addition to the risk of liability, failure of TNCs or TNCs’ suppliers 
to comply with international child labor standards may pose reputational 
risks. An incident involving Gap Inc., an international apparel, accesso-
ries, and personal care products retailer,12 illustrates this point. In Octo-
ber of 2007, in an article entitled “Child Sweatshop Shame Threatens 
Gap’s Ethical Image,” the U.K. newspaper, The Observer, reported that 
Gap Inc. had received merchandise from a factory in India where child-
ren as young as ten years old worked sixteen hours a day without pay.13 
In response, Gap Inc. issued a press release stating that Gap Inc. discon-
tinued the work order placed with that factory.14 The press release, how-
ever, was silent on the future fate of child laborers and whether they in 
fact continued working at that factory after Gap Inc. discovered the vi-
olations.15 This raises the question of how TNCs should respond to child 
labor incidents to assure compliance with international law. 
This Note analyzes the treaty law pertaining to the child labor issues 
involved in the Bridgestone litigation and the Gap Inc. incident. To be 
clear, long before Bridgestone, businesses that conducted activities in a 
foreign jurisdiction could be subject to liability under that jurisdiction’s 
domestic laws.16 This Note examines child labor standards imposed by 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 988, 991, 994, 1019, 1021. 
 11. Id. at 1021. 
 12. Gap Inc., Company Fact Sheet, http://www.gapinc.com/public/About/abt_fact_ 
sheet.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
 13. Dan McDougall, Child Sweatshop Shame Threatens Gap’s Ethical Image, 
OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2007, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,, 
2200573,00.html. 
 14. Press Release, Gap Inc., Gap Inc. Issues Statement on Media Reports on Child 
Labor (Oct. 28, 2007). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Compare Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987) 
(applying Saudi Arabian law to the issues of vicarious liability, existence of an employer-
employee relationship, and the validity of third-party claims that arose in Saudi Arabia), 
with RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973) (finding that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151–69, including the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 141 et seq., does not extend extraterritorially to a U.S. employer in Greenland, 
despite the fact that the employees were hired in the United States, underwent U.S. secu-
rity clearance, were paid from the United States, and returned to the United States upon 
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international law, which historically has been shaped by17 treaties,18 cus-
tomary international law,19 and the general principles of law.20 In recent 
years, “a mushrooming of international norms and institutions”21 has 
embraced other categories, such as peremptory norms22 and “soft law.”23 
While various sources of international law may relate to the problem of 
international child labor,24 this Note focuses on treaties and conventions, 
                                                                                                             
finishing the job). See also Felice Morgenstern & Blaise Knapp, Multinational Enterpris-
es and the Extraterritorial Application of Labour Law, 27 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 769 
(1978) (discussing extraterritorial application of domestic labor law). 
 17. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 18. A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 19. Customary international law is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 
ICJ Statute, supra note 18, art. 38(1)(b). See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 153, 156 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing customary international law). 
 20. The general principles of law “emanate from principles endorsed by the devel-
oped domestic legal systems of different [S]tates.” G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 177 (1993). An example of the general principles of law 
is the principle of good faith. BING CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 105–58 (1987). 
 21. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New 
Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 410 (2007). 
 22. A jus cogens, or a peremptory, norm is “a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.” Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 53. The prohibi-
tion on genocide is an example of a jus cogens norm. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 155, 
199–212; THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392–98 (2006). 
 23. The term “soft law” refers to sources of law other than treaties and custom, for 
example, instruments generated by international bodies, nongovernmental organizations, 
and TNCs. Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 385 
(1998); Levit, supra note 21, at 413–12. 
 24. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient 
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1739 (2007) (assessing the role of TNCs in developing international standards of 
corporate behavior); Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor Prohibitions Are Universal, 
Binding, and Obligatory Law: The Evolving State of Customary International Law Con-
cerning the Unempowered Child Laborer, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 139 (2001) (analyzing 
child labor standards as a matter of international customary law); A.C.L. Davies, Should 
the EU Have the Power to Set Minimum Standards for Collective Labour Rights in the 
Member States, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (dis-
cussing the role of the supranational legislature in the European Union in establishing 
labor standards). 
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which, at least until recently, have represented the strongest form of in-
ternational legal obligations.25 
This Note argues that child labor, as a problem of social and economic 
development, requires TNCs to act proactively. Often, after exposure in 
the media for its association with a supplier that uses child labor, a U.S. 
or other Western company will impulsively discontinue its relationship 
with the supplier or require that child laborers be dismissed from the 
supplier’s production.26 This reactive approach does not squarely address 
the issues that child labor raises and may be inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of children’s human rights. Where a TNC detects incidents of 
child labor, the TNC should focus on creating meaningful alternatives for 
children dismissed from work. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the phenomenon of 
child labor and the role of domestic and international law in child labor 
regulation. Part II analyzes the child labor standards adopted by the In-
ternational Labour Organization (“ILO”),27 including the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor Convention.28 Part III discusses the human rights of eco-
nomically active children, as codified in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.29 Part IV addresses the significance of child labor standards set 
forth in U.S. free trade agreements (“FTAs”). Part V concludes the anal-
ysis and provides recommendations and planning considerations for the 
implementation of international child labor standards in TNCs’ corporate 
compliance programs. 
I. CHILD LABOR AS AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 
Today one in seven children in the world works.30 The term “child” 
generally refers to a person under the age of eighteen,31 and the “eco-
                                                                                                             
 25. JAMES AVERY JOYCE, WORLD LABOUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 21 (1980). 
 26. See John Schmid, Guatemalan Kohl’s Apparel-Maker Signs Labor Pledge, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 2, 2007, available at http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=412 
(quoting Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor Committee, a U.S. nongovernmental 
organization, who has pointed out that when a U.S. company, in order to avoid the asso-
ciation with a sweatshop, withdraws its orders, “the workers [at the sweatshop] get doub-
ly punished”). 
 27. The ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for social and 
labor issues, such as the right to work and social security. JOYCE, supra note 25, at 29; N. 
VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 19 (1979). 
 28. ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
106-5 (1999), 2133 U.N.T.S.161 [hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention]. 
 29. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 30. Seven out of ten working children harvest crops and tend livestock in agriculture. 
Twenty-two percent of working children are in the services sector, where some of them 
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nomic activities” of children are understood to encompass various pro-
ductive functions, paid and unpaid, formal and informal, legal and illeg-
al.32 In this context, as the Bridgestone court has pointed out, “national 
and international norms accommodate a host of different situations” 
where children’s work is acceptable.33 This raises the issue of defining 
prohibited activities encompassed by the term “child labor.” 
A. Defining “Child Labor” 
Children’s economic activities exist within a continuum. On one end of 
the continuum are various exploitative forms of labor, such as the bonded 
labor allegedly involved in the Gap Inc. incident.34 Bonded labor, com-
mon in South Asia, arises when an indebted family puts their children to 
work to pay off the debt.35 As bonded children work for nominal wages 
and the creditor typically retains the major part of the wages as interest,36 
which may be as high as sixty percent, the bondage status may pass to 
the next generation.37 On the other end of the continuum are activities of 
children who were fortunate to become apprentices in trades, which is 
                                                                                                             
are informally employed as domestic workers who prepare meals, wash dishes, or care 
for little children. Nine percent are in the industry sector, which includes construction, 
manufacturing, and mining. Human Rights Watch, Child Domestics: The World  
of Invisible Workers (2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/10/africa8789.htm [he-
reinafter Child Domestics]; Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Facts on Child Labour  
2006 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?product 
Id=2899; ILO, World Day Against Child Labour (2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=4048. 
 31. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 2; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 1 (providing that “a child means every human 
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, major-
ity is attained earlier”). 
 32. The term “economic activity” “encompasses most productive activities underta-
ken by children, whether for the market or not, paid or unpaid, for a few hours or full 
time, on a causal or regular basis, legal or illegal; it excludes chores undertaken in the 
child’s own household or schooling.” ILO, International Labour Conference, May 31–
June 16, 2006, Report of the Director-General, The End of Child Labour: Within Reach, 
Global Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, at 6, Rep. I(B), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ 
relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf [hereinafter ILO, The End of Child Labour]. 
 33. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 34. McDougall, supra note 13. 
 35. A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An 
Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 818, 820–24 
(2005). 
 36. WORLD VISION UK, OFFERING HOPE, NOT DESPAIR: ERADICATING CHILD LABOUR 
WITHOUT PUTTING CHILDREN WORKERS ON THE STREETS 17 (1997). 
 37. Rassam, supra note 35, at 821. 
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sometimes the only realistic way to learn vocational skills in some coun-
tries.38 In India, for example, children in families of artisans, craftsmen, 
and farmers traditionally join their family trade and learn while working 
alongside the family members.39 The question then becomes what factors 
can distinguish “child labor” from other economic activities of children. 
In order to answer this question, it is helpful to identify the concerns 
that child labor raises and the policies underlying the child labor prohibi-
tion. One concern is the children’s health and well-being. For example, 
in Bangladesh alone, fifty child laborers are injured by machinery daily, 
and three of those fifty become permanently disabled.40 Another concern 
is the exploitation of children, as in Guatemala and El Salvador, where 
tens of thousands of domestic servants as young as eight years of age 
work ninety-hour weeks.41 Working children are also often deprived of 
educational opportunities, for example, in rural areas in Mexicali Valley, 
Mexico, where child labor is common and school attendance during the 
harvesting season drops significantly.42 Entering the workforce too early 
reduces the children’s future earnings by thirteen to twenty percent43 and 
hardly benefits the domestic economy because children are generally less 
productive than adults.44 Ultimately, the child labor prohibition aims to 
                                                                                                             
 38. Michael Bonnet, Child Labour in Africa, 132 INT’L LAB. REV. 371, 385–87 
(1993). 
 39. Shahana Dasgupta, Child Welfare Legislation in India: Will Indian Children Ben-
efit from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1301, 1308 (1990). 
 40. ILO, World Day Against Child Labour, supra note 30. In developing countries, 
the rate of injury and illness of working children ranges from twelve percent (for boys in 
agriculture) to thirty-five percent (for girls in construction). ILO, Child Labour in Africa 
(2005), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009 
&context=child. 
 41. Child Domestics, supra note 30. 
 42. DAVID BACON, THE CHILDREN OF NAFTA: LABOR WARS ON THE U.S./MEXICO 
BORDER 33 (2004). 
 43. ILO, The End of Child Labour, supra note 32, at 24. 
 44. Employers in certain industries attempt to justify child labor under the “nimble 
fingers” theory, which holds that children are more productive than adults in carrying out 
certain tasks, such as manual tasks that require dexterity. This theory, however, would 
not be defensible “were it not for the fact that child labor is much cheaper, more subser-
vient, and therefore better exploited by employers.” M. Neil Browne et al., Universal 
Moral Principles and the Law: The Failure of One-Size-Fits-All Child Labor Laws, 27 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 28–29 (2004). See also Savitri Goonesekere, The Best Interests of the 
Child: A South Asian Perspective, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING 
CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 143 (Philip Alston ed., 1994) (discussing Mehta v. 
State of Tamil Nadu, a 1990 decision of the Supreme Court of India, which held that the 
need for children’s work in the matches industry in Sivakasi outweighed the concern for 
2008] INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR REGULATION 213 
eliminate practices that impede children’s development and education.45 
As a matter of social policy, the child labor prohibition ensures the de-
velopment of human capital and, consequently, long-term social and 
economic growth.46 
The prohibition of child labor, however, does not discourage children 
from contributing to the family’s budget, learning vocational skills and 
participating in communal life through their economic activities.47 Daily, 
some 30,000 children worldwide die as a result of extreme poverty,48 and 
thus, children’s economic activities may be essential to their survival. A 
factory in Kutsia, Bangladesh, for instance, dismissed orphans who were 
too young to work.49 These children eventually attempted to return to the 
factory by bribing the supervisors or by staying on after bringing lunch to 
their elder siblings because it was the children’s only opportunity to earn 
a living.50 In addition, through their productive activities, children inte-
grate into the community, as in Africa, where children as young as ten 
years old begin imitating their family members in the household and 
farm tasks, and then move to other tasks, including serving the elders in 
their community.51 As such, notions about the appropriateness of child-
ren’s economic activities vary among countries. 
                                                                                                             
their well-being since “tender hands of children are more suited to the sorting out of the 
manufactured product, and processing it for purposes of packing”). 
 45. See Ranjan K. Agarwal, The Barefoot Lawyers: Prosecuting Child Labour in the 
Supreme Court of India, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 676 (2004) (discussing the 
effects of child labor on children’s schooling and vocational training). See also Beatrice 
Adenike Oloko, Children’s Work in Urban Nigeria: A Case Study of Young Lagos Street 
Traders, in PROTECTING WORKING CHILDREN 13–21 (William E. Myers ed., 1991) (dis-
cussing the impact of children’s involvement in street trading on their academic achieve-
ment). 
 46. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential 
of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 246–47 (2004). 
 47. See Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role of International Labour 
Standards, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 362, 363 (1997) (providing examples of children’s work 
that is not abusive or exploitative); ILO, World Day Against Child Labour, supra note 30 
(discussing child labor in agriculture and pointing out that not all work negatively affects 
children). 
 48. ILO, The End of Child Labour, supra note 32, at 1. 
 49. JEREMY SEABROOK, CHILDREN OF OTHER WORLDS: EXPLOITATION IN THE GLOBAL 
MARKET 23 (2001). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Bonnet, supra note 38, at 377. See also B. Rwezaura, The Concept of the Child’s 
Best Interest in the Changing Economic and Social Context of Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 44, at 82, 89–92 (discussing economic activities of children in Sub-Saharan Africa). 
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B. The Role of Domestic Law in Regulating Child Labor 
Child labor laws originally developed in domestic legal systems52 and 
reflected domestic ideology, economy, and culture. In the United States, 
for example, the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act was adopted after the 
Lochner53 era of free labor ideology54 and left the entire agricultural sec-
tor unregulated.55 Today, this federal statute56 outlaws only “oppres-
sive”57 child labor and, generally, sets fourteen as the minimum age for 
nonagricultural work, but exempts from regulation children’s work at 
family-owned businesses and farms, as performers and babysitters, and 
in certain other settings.58 In India, in turn, where child labor is com-
mon,59 the 1986 Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act restricts 
employment of children under fourteen only in specific occupations and 
                                                                                                             
 52. Rajani Kanta Das, Child Labour in India I, 28 INT’L LAB. REV. 796, 811, 814 
(1933). 
 53. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York statute that 
limited work hours for bakers as violating the rights to property and contractual autono-
my implicated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution). Cf. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the consti-
tutional validity of the minimum wage law of the State of Washington). 
 54. Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1119, 1122 (2006). 
 55. HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 85 (2002). 
 56. Individual States within the United States may promulgate more protective child 
labor laws. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Admin., State Labor Laws, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/state/state.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2008) (summarizing labor 
laws in individual U.S. States). 
 57. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) (2006), defines “oppressive 
child labor” as follows: 
[A] condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of 
sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person 
standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody 
under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or 
mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly ha-
zardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eigh-
teen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) 
any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by 
an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by 
order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children be-
tween such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive 
child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any oc-
cupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an 
unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of 
Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age. 
 58. Id. §§ 203, 212, 213(c)–(d), 214. 
 59. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 114 (2000). 
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processes, including tasks characteristic of the South Asian economy 
such as the making of beedi (hand-rolled local cigarettes),60 carpet-
weaving,61 and, as of 2006, working in dhabas (road-side eateries) and 
tea-shops.62 These examples demonstrate that individual governments 
can tailor their domestic child labor laws to fit into their specific eco-
nomic and social policies. 
Domestic child labor regulation may also respond to unique changes 
occurring in a particular jurisdiction. In Russia, for instance, the 1990s 
jump from a centrally planned economy to the free-market “gangster ca-
pitalism”63 has led to a demographic crisis, which has resulted in a 
750,000–800,000 annual population drop64 and the emergence of “street 
children”—homeless and orphaned children living in the streets.65 The 
2001 Russian Labor Code addresses this crisis by prohibiting employ-
ment of children under sixteen66 and affirmatively guarantying thirty-one 
                                                                                                             
 60. Beedi are also known as bidi or biri. Manas Bhattacharya et al., Making Ends 
Meet: Bidi Workers in India Today, A Study of Four States 1–2, 78 (Int’l Labour Org., 
Sectoral Activities Programme, Working Paper, provisional ed., 2003), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/food/wp202.pdf. See SEABROOK, 
supra note 49, at 23, 65 (discussing bidi). 
 61. Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, Act No. 61 (1986) (India), avail-
able at http://labour.gov.in/cwl/ChildLabour.htm (click on the “Child Labour (Prohibi-
tion & Regulation) Act” hyperlink). The Constitution of India provides that “no child 
below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or en-
gaged in any other hazardous employment.” INDIA CONST. art. 24. See also Dasgupta, 
supra note 39, at 1304–07 (examining the laws of India pertaining to child labor). 
 62. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Notification, The Gazette of India, Oct. 10, 
2006, Extraordinary, No. 1211, 2, pt II, sec.3(ii), S.O. 1742(E), available at http://labour. 
nic.in/cwl/clBanningFinalOrder.pdf. 
 63. GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (2001). 
 64. This decrease is a result of a misbalance between the population birth and death 
rates. This problem is sometimes referred to as the “lost generation of the 1990s.” A.G. 
GLISKOV ET AL., PRAVA I OBJAZANNOSTI NESOVERŠENNOLETNIH (KOMMENTARII K ZAKO-
NODATEL’STVU O PRAVAH NESOVERŠENNOLETNIH I ZAŠČITE ETIH PRAV ) [RIGHTS AND DU- 
TIES OF MINORS (COMMENTARY ON THE LEGISLATURE ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORS AND 
PROTECTION THEREOF)] 8–9 (2007). 
 65. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR’S 2006 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 389–90 (2007). 
 66. Three exceptions to this rule are (1) employment of a child fifteen years or older 
who has graduated from or left in accordance with the federal law a basic general (sec-
ondary) educational establishment, (2) light work of a fourteen-year-old, not harmful to 
the child’s health and education process, with the consent of one parent (guardian or cus-
todian) and the patronage body, outside of school hours, and (3) participation in the crea-
tion and/or performance of art works, without any harm to the child’s health and moral 
development, in movie, theatre, concert and circus organizations, with the consent of one 
parent (guardian or custodian) and the patronage body. Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor 
Code] art. 63 (Russ.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/60535/ 
216 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:1 
days of paid vacation to workers under eighteen67 and an annual medical 
examination at the employer’s expense.68 The City of Moscow responded 
on the local government level by mandating employers with more than a 
hundred employees to set a four percent minimum quota for orphans un-
der twenty-three, adolescents under eighteen, and the disabled.69 As indi-
vidual States and local governments may seem better positioned in de-
signing specific policies with respect to child labor, it is important to ad-
dress why child labor is also regulated internationally. 
C. Regulating Child Labor on the International Level 
Parallel with the development of domestic child labor laws, the idea of 
international regulation of child labor emerged, and it was supported by 
regulatory, economic, and humanitarian arguments.70 Less labor regula-
tion in one country may be a factor in attracting employers from other 
parts of the world,71 which, consequently, disadvantages workers in 
countries with tougher labor laws, such as developed countries.72 Labor 
regulation on the international level curbs such attempts to gain a com-
petitive edge by sacrificing labor protections.73 As for the economic as-
pect of international child labor regulation, poverty is a significant cause 
                                                                                                             
65252/E01RUS01.htm; O.B. SMIRNOV ET AL., KOMMENTARII K TRUDOVOMU KODEKSU 
ROSSIJ-SKOJ FEDERACII [COMMENTARY ON THE LABOR CODE OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION] 160–61 (2007). 
 67. Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor Code], supra note 66, art. 267 (“Employees under 
[eighteen] years old are granted an annual paid leave of [thirty-one] calendar days at any 
time convenient to them.”). 
 68. Id. art. 266 (“Persons under [eighteen] years old are to be employed only after 
preliminary medical survey and are to pass an annual medical survey up to when they 
reach [eighteen] years old. The medical surveys specified in the present Article are paid 
at the expense of the employer.”). 
 69. GLISKOV ET AL., supra note 64, at 451; N. N. ŠEPULINA, NOVOE ZAKONODATEL’-
STVO OB OHRANE TRUDA [THE NEW LEGISALTURE ON LABOR PROTECTION] 172 (2007). 
 70. VALTICOS, supra note 27, at 17–18. 
 71. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of Core Labor Rights in 
World Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 39, 41 (2004); Kevin Kolben, Integrative Lin-
kage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and 
Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 203, 206–07 (2007). 
 72. See TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 19, 35–36; Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry & Eric Gra-
vel, Free Trade Agreements and Labour Rights: Recent Developments, 145 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 185, 189 (2006) (discussing the concern about a “protectionist backlash from the 
developed countries” in enforcement of labor rights through trade agreements). 
 73. Doumbia-Henry & Gravel, supra note 72, at 189; Kolben, supra note 71, at 206–
07. 
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and, at the same time, a consequence of child labor.74 In developing 
countries, where child labor is prevalent,75 this creates a vicious cycle, 
and so international regulation of child labor may help to break this 
cycle.76 Moreover, labor rights (which in the United States are often re-
ferred to as “workers’ rights”)77 involve human rights,78 such as the right 
to be free from exploitation.79 These arguments have prompted the gra-
dual development of international child labor regulation, as reflected in 
the conventions of the ILO. 
II. CHILD LABOR STANDARDS IN THE ILO CONVENTIONS 
The ILO is an international body that develops labor standards through 
adoption of conventions and recommendations80 and engages govern-
                                                                                                             
 74. Browne et al., supra note 44, at 26–27. See also Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, supra note 28, pmbl. (stating that “child labor is to a great extent caused by 
poverty”). 
 75. Agarwal, supra note 45, at 665. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest percentage of 
economically active children (twenty-six percent), followed by the Asian-Pacific region 
(less than twenty percent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (five percent). ILO, 
Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 30. 
 76. Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 412, 413 (1998). 
 77. Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Un-
intended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work? 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 224 (2004). 
 78. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits all forms of 
slavery and “forced or compulsory labour” and affirms the rights to unionize and to be 
free from discrimination. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 8, 22, 
26, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights provides for the right to be free from discrimination, the “right to 
work,” the right “to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work,” the right to 
unionize, and the right to social security. International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights arts. 2(2), 6–9, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights affirms the equality of “all human beings,” prohibits all forms of sla-
very, and provides for the “right to work,” “free choice of employment,” “just and fa-
vourable conditions of work,” “protection against unemployment,” “equal pay for equal 
work,” “just and favorable remuneration,” the right to unionize, and “the right to rest and 
leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with 
pay.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 72–73, 75, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). See also Philip Als-
ton, Labour Rights as Human Rights: The Not So Happy State of the Art, in LABOUR 
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 1, 2–5 (discussing labor rights as human 
rights). 
 79. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 78, at 72. 
 80. The ILO conventions have the force of treaties and bind the States that ratify such 
conventions. The ILO recommendations are nonbinding policy guidelines. JOYCE, supra 
note 25, at 26; TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 43–44. 
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ments, employers, and workers in the standard-setting process in a model 
known as the “tripartite structure.”81 Prior to 1973, the ILO generated 
standards for individual economic sectors, such as industry or agricul-
ture,82 and focused on “child welfare”83 rather than child labor abolition. 
The 1973 Minimum Age Convention No. 138,84 which is currently in 
force,85 was the first “umbrella”86 convention that covered all economic 
sectors87 and identified the goal of child labor abolition.88 The United 
States has not ratified this Convention.89 The Convention, however, pro-
vides a framework for analyzing the 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, which the United States has ratified.90 
                                                                                                             
 81. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation art. 7, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 
3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35; JOYCE, supra note 25, at 32–35. As of October 5, 2008, 182 coun-
tries are ILO members. Int’l Labour Org., Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries 
(182 Countries), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last vi-
sited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 82. See, e.g., ILO Convention (No. 59) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of 
Children to Industrial Employment, June 22, 1937, 40 U.N.T.S. 217; ILO Convention 
(No. 10) Concerning the Age for Admission of Children to Employment in Agriculture, 
Nov. 16, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 143; ILO Convention (No. 6) Concerning the Night Work of 
Young Persons Employed in Industry, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 93; ILO Convention 
(No. 5) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Industrial Employment, 
Nov. 28, 1919, 38 L.N.T.S. 81. 
 83. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, supra note 81, Annex, 
III(h). 
 84. ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Em-
ployment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter Minimum Age Convention]. 
 85. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, Ratifications by Country or by 
Convention, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 
2008). 
 86. Int’l Labour Conf., 90th Sess., A Future Without Child Labor, Global Report 
under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, rpt. I(B), 2 (2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB 
.DOWNLOAD_BLOB?Var_DocumentID=1566 [hereinafter ILC, A Future Without Child 
Labor]. 
 87. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, pmbl., art. 1. 
 88. Id. pmbl., art. 10. 
 89. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85. 
 90. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28. The United States has 
ratified two ILO Conventions: the 1957 Forced Labor Convention and the 1999 Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention. The standards of the former, as applied to the em-
ployment of youth, overlap with those of the latter. Compare ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 88-11 
(1963), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-3 (1991), 320 U.N.T.S. 291, with Worst Forms of Child 
Labor Convention, supra note 28, pmbl. (stating that “some of the worst forms of child 
labour are covered by other international instruments, in particular the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930”). ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85. 
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A. The Framework of the Minimum Age Convention No. 138 
The 1973 Minimum Age Convention No. 138 distinguishes child labor 
from other economic activities of children based on the child’s age and 
the work setting. Children under eighteen years old91 generally may not 
engage in work “which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is 
carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young 
persons.”92 As Recommendation No. 146 accompanying the Convention 
provides, the determination regarding the types of work to which this 
limitation will apply should take into consideration relevant international 
standards, such as those pertaining to the use of dangerous substances 
and processes.93 In contrast, States may permit adolescents between thir-
teen and fifteen years of age to perform “light work,”94 defined as work 
that is “not likely to be harmful to their health or development”95 and 
does not prejudice children’s education or vocational training.96 This cor-
relation between the child’s age and the type of work created a new 
framework for defining child labor across economic sectors. 
Despite this progress in defining child labor, the Convention failed to 
attract a sufficient number of ratifications at the time of its adoption, es-
pecially among the States where child labor was common, such as India, 
Indonesia, and Pakistan.97 Developing countries, contending with “ex-
                                                                                                             
 91. Under the Minimum Age Convention, States may, however, upon consultation 
with the concerned organizations of employers and workers, authorize employment or 
work of persons from the age of sixteen, “on condition that the health, safety and morals 
of the young persons concerned are fully protected and that the young persons have re-
ceived adequate specific instruction or vocational training in the relevant branch of activi-
ty.” Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 3(3). 
 92. Id. art. 3(1). 
 93. ILO Minimum Age Recommendation (No. 146) art. 10(1), June 26, 1973, availa-
ble at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R146. 
 94. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 7(1). 
 95. Id. art. 7(1)(a). 
 96. Id. art. 7(1)(b). 
 97. By 1996, out of 173 ILO members, only forty-nine ratified the Minimum Age 
Convention. David M. Smolin, Strategic Choices in the International Campaign Against 
Child Labor, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 942, 945 (2000). Indonesia and Pakistan ratified the Con-
vention in 1999 and 2006, respectively. To date, 150 States have ratified the Convention, 
excluding India, Liberia, and the United States. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Stan-
dards, supra note 85. Approximately only a quarter of all ILO members ratified other 
ILO instruments protecting working children, such as conventions requiring employers to 
conduct annual medical examinations of children-employees. Id. See, e.g., ILO Conven-
tion (No. 124) Concerning Medical Examination of Young Persons for Fitness for Em-
ployment Underground in Mines, June 23, 1965, 614 U.N.T.S. 239; ILO Convention (No. 
78) Concerning Medical Examination of Children and Young Persons for Fitness for 
Employment in Non-Industrial Occupations, Oct. 9, 1946, 78 U.N.T.S. 213. 
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plosive population growth, endemic poverty, and lack of adequate infra-
structure,”98 found the Convention insufficiently flexible, despite its 
“flexibility clauses,”99 because the Convention failed to identify the im-
mediate priorities and a methodology for achieving the goal of child la-
bor abolition.100 As for developed countries, the Convention’s presump-
tion that the work of children under thirteen is impermissible under any 
circumstances contradicted the preference of such countries to leave the 
part-time work of youth, such as morning newspaper delivery by a 
twelve-year-old, in the realm of parental control and public opinion ra-
ther than regulation by law.101 Thus, the Minimum Age Convention No. 
138 provided a new framework for analyzing child labor, but failed to 
achieve international consensus on the issue. 
B. The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention: Reaching a Consensus 
In the 1990s, the ILO undertook a “strategic shift”102 in its policy on 
child labor and identified the elimination of the worst forms of child la-
bor as a priority. The ILO moved from traditional labor issues, such as 
the regulation of work conditions, to criminal law areas, such as child 
trafficking and the economic exploitation of children through prostitution 
and military recruitment.103 This approach culminated in the 1999 Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention, a product of the realization that im-
mediate steps needed to be taken to abolish intolerable forms of child 
labor.104 One hundred and sixty-five countries, including the United 
States, have ratified this Convention.105 
                                                                                                             
 98. Creighton, supra note 47, at 388. 
 99. Id. at 391. Under the Minimum Age Convention, in certain circumstances, States 
may exclude limited categories of work from the application of the Convention, and de-
veloping countries, in particular, may set the minimum age at fourteen years. In addition, 
the Convention does not apply to certain types of work performed as part of children’s 
education or training. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 2(4), 4, 5(3), 6. 
 100. Creighton, supra note 47, at 390–92. 
 101. Id. 386–88. 
 102. Smolin, supra note 97, at 942. 
 103. See Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, pmbl., art. 3(a)–(c) 
(recognizing “the need to adopt new instruments for the prohibition and elimination of 
the worst forms of child labour,” such as trafficking and forced or compulsory military 
recruitment of children). 
 104. Michael J. Dennis, The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 943, 943 (1999); Yoshie Noguchi, ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 INT’L J. CHILD. 
RTS. 355, 355 (2002). 
 105. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85. 
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The Convention applies to all persons under eighteen years of age106 
and focuses on the abolition of two categories of child labor: the “uncon-
ditional worst forms of child labor” and “hazardous work.”107 The un-
conditional worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery,” debt bondage, and the use of children in 
various illicit activities.108 These forms of labor are prohibited uncondi-
tionally because improving their conditions would not justify such prac-
tices.109 Similarly to the Minimum Age Convention No. 138, hazardous 
work encompasses “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in 
which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of 
children.”110 The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention refers to111 a 
list of considerations for identifying “hazardous work” as set forth in 
ILO Recommendation No. 190.112 These considerations include, without 
limitation, exposure to dangerous machinery and substances damaging to 
health.113 Because of its focus on the intolerable forms of child labor, the 
                                                                                                             
 106. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 2. 
 107. The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation refers to the forms of 
child labor prohibited under Article 3(d) of the Convention as “hazardous work.” ILO 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation (No. 190) art. 3, June 17, 1999, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/3ddb6ef34.pdf. Commentators use the term 
“unconditional forms worst forms of child labor” to refer to the practices identified in 
Article 3(a)–(c) of the Convention. See, e.g., Noguchi, supra note 104, at 358. 
 108. The unconditional forms of child labor comprise the following: 
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and traf-
ficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory la-
bour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed 
conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the 
production of pornography or for pornographic performances; (c) the use, pro-
curing or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production 
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties. 
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(a)–(c). 
 109. Noguchi, supra note 104, at 358. 
 110. The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention replaced the word “jeopardize” in 
the definition of “hazardous work” in the Minimum Age Convention with the word 
“harm”: “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is like-
ly to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” Compare Worst Forms of Child La-
bor Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(d) (emphasis added), with Minimum Age Conven-
tion, supra note 84, art. 3(1). 
 111. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 4(1). 
 112. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation (No. 190), supra note 110, 
art. 3. 
 113. Other relevant considerations are “work which exposes children to physical, psy-
chological or sexual abuse”; “work underground, under water, at dangerous heights or in 
confined spaces”; “work with dangerous machinery, equipment and tools, or which in-
volves the manual handling or transport of heavy loads”; “work in an unhealthy environ-
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Convention has limited its scope, but achieved greater acceptance than 
the Minimum Age Convention No. 138.114 
Unlike its predecessor, the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 
provides guidance on achieving its goals and mandates a proactive ap-
proach to the child labor problem.115 The Convention stresses the need to 
“reach out to children at special risk”116 and prevent children from en-
gaging in the worst forms of child labor.117 With respect to children re-
moved from work, the Convention emphasizes the importance of meas-
ures for “rehabilitation and social integration”118 and access to free basic 
education and vocational training.119 Thus, the Convention makes it clear 
that not only should children be protected from certain categories of 
work, children should also be protected from the need to work. 
Empirical data supports this approach and shows that child labor aboli-
tion requires proactive measures that address the root causes of child la-
bor. For example, the bolsa escola program in Brazil provides a monthly 
minimum salary to poor families whose children stay in school.120 This 
eliminates the need for the children to join the workforce too early and 
prevents them from dropping out of school, which has made the program 
a success.121 Remedial and educational programs such as bolsa escola 
show that the solution to the child labor problem lies in “capacity build-
ing”122 measures—steps aimed at enhancing the economy, educational 
system, and civic participation in a community.123 
                                                                                                             
ment which may, for example, expose children to hazardous substances, agents or 
processes, or to temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations damaging to their health”; and 
“work under particularly difficult conditions such as work for long hours or during the 
night or work where the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the employer.” 
Id. art. 3. 
 114. Dennis, supra note 104, at 943. 
 115. Noguchi, supra note 104, at 360–61. 
 116. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 7(2)(d). 
 117. Id. art. 7(2)(a). 
 118. Id. art. 7(2)(b). 
 119. Id. art. 7(2)(c). 
 120. ILC, A Future Without Child Labor, supra note 86, at 101. 
 121. Id. 
 122. WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 10. 
 123. See SEN, supra note 59, 112–16 (examining the interrelation between markets, 
liberty, and labor); Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Priori-
tizing for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 J. AFRICAN L. 1, 4 (2003) (dis-
cussing the role of development in fulfillment of human rights). 
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE CHILDREN 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child,124 which memorializes125 
the principles of children’s human rights, identifies two aspects of child-
ren’s economic activities. On the one hand, children have the right to be 
free from exploitation and involvement in hazardous work,126 as well as 
to enjoy rest and leisure.127 On the other hand, children have the rights to 
survival128 and an adequate standard of living,129 which are implicated in 
situations where children work in order to support themselves and their 
families. 
The interaction between these two aspects of children’s economic ac-
tivities can be illustrated by the public debate that surrounded the 1992 
Child Labor Deterrence Act130 proposed in the U.S. Congress. This bill 
sought to introduce sanctions with respect to imported products made 
with child labor131 and, thus, advance children’s right to be free from ex-
ploitation. In response to this bill, Bangladeshi local activists asserted 
that dismissing children from the garment industry would mean throwing 
them into the streets without means of subsistence and effectively forcing 
                                                                                                             
 124. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29. The United States has not 
ratified this Convention. The United States has ratified the Optional Protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, 
Annex I, II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000). Office of the U.N. High Comm’r 
for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights 
Treaties, June 9, 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. The United States has ex-
pressed four areas of concern pertaining to the Convention, namely, sovereignty, federal-
ism, reproductive rights, and parents’ rights. Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer 
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 168, 171–72 (2006). The Convention 
may establish principles of customary international law. Bullard, supra note 24. 
 125. Instruments preceding the Convention on the Rights of the Child include the Dec-
laration of the Rights of the Child, which enumerates ten principles of children’s rights. 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at 19, U.N. GAOR, 14th 
Sess., 841st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959). 
 126. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that States “recognize the 
right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any 
work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.” 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 32. 
 127. Id. art. 31. 
 128. Id. art. 6(2). 
 129. Id. art. 27. 
 130. Child Labor Deterrence Act, S. 3133, 102nd Cong. (1992). 
 131. Id. § 5. 
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the children into more hazardous occupations,132 which would jeopardize 
the children’s rights to survival and an adequate standard of living. In 
fact, between 1992 and 1995, Bangladeshi manufacturers dismissed tens 
of thousands of children who subsequently became rickshaw pullers, 
brick carriers, rag-pickers, and prostitutes.133 Some 40,000 children dis-
missed from the factories were never seen again.134 This example de-
monstrates that children’s right to be free from exploitation and their 
right to survival should be balanced. 
As the right to survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of 
other rights, one may suggest that the right to survival should trump other 
rights. But this logic fails in situations involving hazardous work, for 
example, deep sea fishing. In the Philippines, a country of seven thousand 
islands, children work in pa-aling, or deep sea fishing, where, carrying 
hoses attached to a surface air compressor, children dive approximately 
thirty to fifty feet without protective gear and chase fish into the nets.135 
This exposes children to ear injuries, shark attacks, and drowning.136 The 
example of deep-sea fishing shows that the very economic opportunity 
that enables a child to earn a living and survive may, at the same time, 
expose the child to occupational hazards, and thus, threaten the child’s 
survival. The difficulty in balancing the two rights may be paralyzing for 
the employer: regardless of whether the employer dismisses the child 
from work or allows the child to work, the employer would in effect take 
away the child’s rights. 
The “best interests” principle helps to resolve this tension. This prin-
ciple, as codified in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, provides 
that, in all actions involving the child, the “best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration.”137 The drafters’ use of the indefinite 
article in the term “a primary consideration” shows that the child’s inter-
                                                                                                             
 132. Shareen Hertel, New Moves in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labor and Eco-
nomic Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 263, 267–68 
(2006). 
 133. SEABROOK, supra note 49, 64–65; WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 7. 
 134. Hertel, supra note 132, at 270. See also WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 7 
(discussing the consequences of dismissing children from work). 
 135. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACES OF CHANGE: HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR EFFORTS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR 6 (2003). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 3(1). The “best inter-
ests” approach is the general principle of law common to many countries. Jacqueline 
Rubellin-Devichi, The Best Interests Principle in French Law and Practice, in THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 
259, 260. 
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ests are not an overriding factor,138 but the choice of the word “consid-
eration” (as opposed to “element” or “factor”) demonstrates that the 
child’s interests “must actually be considered.”139 As such, this principle 
accommodates various ideological, social, and cultural approaches in a 
universal norm and demands the consideration of the child’s unique cir-
cumstances.140 
The concept of children’s participatory rights may aid in ascertaining 
such circumstances. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides 
for a bundle of participatory rights, namely, the freedom of expression, 
conscience, and assembly.141 In essence, the concept of participatory 
rights or “participation” requires that, depending on the child’s maturity, 
the child should participate in decisions about his or her life142 and have 
the opportunity to be “present or consulted.”143 As children have been 
“the most photographed and the least listened to members of society,”144 
the Convention’s codification of this broad range of participatory rights 
is a step forward in the fulfillment of children’s rights.145 
Participation empowers the child by including the child in the decision-
making process concerning his or her life, which the following examples 
illustrate. A nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), Save the Children 
UK, which conducted evaluation missions in Honduras, Bangladesh, and 
Burkina Faso, engaged children in data collection and found that child-
ren-interviewers can be “particularly effective as children may relate to 
                                                                                                             
 138. Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Conciliation of Culture 
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each other in a more open way.”146 Another NGO, Undugu Society, or-
ganized group meetings for street children in Mathare Valley, a slum in 
Nairobi, Kenya, who supported themselves by collecting plastic, scrap 
metal, and paper bags around the city.147 In the course of these meetings, 
children learned how to read a weighing scale and calculate the price of 
what they were selling in order to avoid being cheated by the street buy-
ers.148 The children ultimately decided to sell scrap metal directly to the 
factory where the price would be fixed, making cheating less likely.149 
These examples demonstrate that working children find ways to subsist 
in a dangerous world on a daily basis, and therefore, they can help in 
identifying realistic solutions to the child labor problem. 
IV. CHILD LABOR STANDARDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
In addition to the ILO conventions and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, several U.S. FTAs set forth child labor standards. General-
ly, parties entering into an FTA agree to eliminate tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade in goods among themselves, facilitating easier access to 
each other’s markets.150 This integration of regional trade regimes may 
reveal inequalities in labor conditions in such regimes, which some FTAs 
address by imposing labor standards, also referred to as “social claus-
es.”151 Alternatively, signatories to an FTA may choose to enter into a 
side agreement with respect to labor standards, such as the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”).152 NAALC was the 
first labor accord to supplement an FTA,153 namely, the 1992 North 
American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States (“NAFTA”).154 
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The inclusion of labor standards in FTAs opens the possibility of using 
trade sanctions as a mechanism for enforcing these standards155—an ave-
nue unavailable under the ILO conventions. Under the ILO Constitution, 
the ILO may recommend “such action as it may deem wise and expe-
dient to secure compliance,”156 but the ILO has never imposed and, under 
the current version of the ILO Constitution,157 does not have express au-
thority to impose, economic sanctions.158 Currently, the United States is a 
party to over a dozen bilateral and regional FTAs.159 These FTAs differ 
in their approaches to the use of trade sanctions in enforcing child labor 
standards, as NAALC, the 2000 U.S.-Jordan FTA,160 and the 2004 Cen-
tral American-Dominican Republic-U.S. FTA161(“CAFTA-DR”) illu-
strate. 
A. NAALC: The First Labor Accord to Accompany an FTA 
NAALC was intended to address the concern of U.S. labor unions 
about the potential accelerated migration of U.S. jobs to Mexico, where 
the relatively high existing labor standards were inadequately en-
forced.162 This accord, however, does not establish new standards, and its 
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effect in terms of improvement in the labor conditions has been li-
mited.163 
NAALC neither incorporates international child labor standards nor in-
troduces minimum standards for the signatories’ domestic laws.164 In-
stead, the accord affirms the parties’ rights to establish their own labor 
laws165: each party has to “ensure” that such laws provide for “high stan-
dards” and “strive to improve” them.166 NAALC identifies eleven “guid-
ing principles”167 that the signatories agree to promote, including “labor 
protections for children and young persons.”168 This principle requires 
“the establishment of restrictions on the employment of children and 
young persons that may vary taking into consideration relevant factors 
likely to jeopardize the full physical, mental and moral development of 
young persons, including schooling and safety requirements.”169 Neither 
in this pronouncement nor elsewhere in the agreement does NAALC set 
child labor abolition as a goal or specify the minimum age for employ-
ment of children.170 
The enforcement mechanisms for these relatively weak standards are 
toothless.171 NAALC expressly denies any party’s rights to “undertake 
law enforcement activities” on another party’s territory172 and any right 
to private actions in domestic legal systems.173 The NAALC signatories 
agree to advance the guiding principles through collaboration, coopera-
tion, and information exchange.174 For these purposes, NAALC creates 
several procedures and bodies for dispute resolution through consulta-
tions and arbitration,175 including the Commission for Labor Coopera-
tion.176 Under these procedures, however, it may take a dispute over three 
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years to reach the stage where sanctions may be considered,177 and even 
in that case, remedies in the form of monetary penalties and suspension 
of trade benefits under NAFTA are limited to “persistent patterns” of 
non-enforcement.178 
Meanwhile, child labor in Mexico continues to be a problem.179 Be-
tween 1999 and 2005, sixteen percent of children ages five to fourteen in 
Mexico were engaged in child labor.180 The majority of these children 
worked for small companies, in agriculture and construction, where labor 
enforcement is inadequate.181 A recent incident involving nine-year-old 
David Salgado Aranda, as reported by the U.N. Children’s Fund, sup-
ports this contention.182 David migrated with his parents to Sinaloa, 
northern Mexico, looking for seasonal work, similar to some 300,000 
other migrant workers’ children ages six and older.183 While David was 
working picking tomatoes, he was run over by a tractor and killed.184  
David was too young to have been working on a commercial plantation. 
As these reports and statistics illustrate, NAALC did not have the antic-
ipated positive effect on labor conditions in Mexico.185 This instrument, 
however, raised the issue of the protection of working children, which 
was a step toward solving the child labor problem. 
B. The High Watermark of Child Labor Standards: The U.S.-Jordan FTA 
The subsequently concluded U.S.-Jordan FTA provides more stringent 
labor protections than NAALC. The U.S.-Jordan FTA reaffirms the sig-
natories’ obligations as ILO members,186 incorporates internationally 
recognized minimum age standards,187 and contains a “no relaxation 
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clause,” under which the parties may not weaken existing domestic labor 
standards.188 The agreement enforces compliance with labor provisions 
through trade sanctions.189 Due to its high standards and direct enforce-
ment through trade sanctions, the U.S.-Jordan FTA has been characte-
rized as the high watermark in FTA labor protections.190 The U.N. Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child has praised the measures for eliminat-
ing child labor in Jordan, including the enhancement of domestic child 
labor laws in Jordan and establishment of a national database on child 
labor.191 This FTA indicates that where the ILO, lacking the ability to 
impose economic sanctions, fails to enforce international labor standards, 
trade agreements could potentially take on this role.192 
C. CAFTA-DR as a “Missed Opportunity”193 to Improve Labor Condi-
tions 
CAFTA-DR stands out among U.S. FTAs because it has created the 
second-largest free trade area for U.S. exports in Latin America.194 In 
terms of labor protections, CAFTA-DR is similar to NAALC in that it 
only addresses the parties’ enforcement of their own “labor laws,”195 
which CAFTA-DR defines to include the parties’ laws “directly related” 
to the international minimum age requirements and the elimination of the 
worst forms of child labor.196 CAFTA-DR subjects labor claims to dis-
pute resolution procedures separate from those for commercial disputes197 
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and does not authorize trade sanctions for labor violations.198 Instead, 
CAFTA-DR contains a provision for “monetary assessment” payable to a 
fund that CAFTA-DR creates,199 which means that such assessment is 
not payable to the aggrieved party.200 Additionally, CAFTA-DR caps 
such monetary assessment at fifteen million U.S. dollars per year.201 For 
its failure to establish and strictly enforce labor standards, this FTA has 
been criticized in the United States as inadequate.202 
A representative of the National Labor Committee, a U.S. NGO whose 
mission is to help “defend the human rights of workers in the global 
economy,”203 recently visited the Legumex factory in Guatemala, a sig-
natory to CAFTA-DR.204 The Legumex factory processes fruits and veg-
etables for export to the United States.205 Through reports of the National 
Labor Committee, the international community learned that at the facto-
ry, thirteen-year-old children were working twelve-hour shifts, wearing 
only t-shirts in an area surrounded by food freezers.206 A child worker 
cutting vegetables for the U.S. consumer has to cut every head of brocco-
li into ninety-seven pieces in sixty-four seconds, thus, making one cut 
every seven-tenths of a second throughout the shift.207 For the duration of 
their twelve-hour shifts, children cutting watermelons stand in an inch of 
watermelon juice dripping from the cutting tables, children’s wrists swol-
len and their feet cracked and bleeding.208 These findings support the 
contention that CAFTA-DR was “a missed opportunity”209 in improving 
labor conditions in CAFTA-DR countries. 
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To conclude, U.S. FTAs that contain provisions concerning working 
children generally do not set new child labor standards. These agree-
ments, however, encourage the signatories to comply with existing stan-
dards and raise awareness regarding child labor issues. Some FTAs also 
enforce child labor standards through trade sanctions. 
V. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR 
STANDARDS 
As international child labor standards are evolving, TNCs seeking to 
manage their litigation and reputational risks should incorporate these 
standards into their compliance programs. The purpose of a compliance 
program is to ensure that individual and collective behavior within the 
corporation follows applicable laws.210 In a compliance program, the focus 
is on development of specific business processes and internal mechan-
isms that proactively prevent and avoid violations of law.211 
Compliance programs should be distinguished from codes of conduct 
and other ethical business initiatives. Numerous TNCs, including Brid-
gestone Corporation212 and Gap Inc.,213 have adopted codes of conduct—
“statements of company policy”214 announcing the company’s commit-
ment to ethical business conduct.215 Similarly to codes of conduct, various 
“labeling” initiatives certify manufacturers and producers that comply 
with child labor standards. For example, the international NGO RugMark 
Foundation certifies child-labor compliant carpet manufacturers in South 
Asia.216 These ethical business initiatives contribute to the goal of child 
labor abolition, but differ from compliance programs in that ethical busi-
ness initiatives are voluntary and primarily designed as a marketing 
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tool.217 In contrast, compliance programs focus on internal policies and 
procedures guiding TNCs’ employees and suppliers and reflecting spe-
cific legal standards. 
To create a compliance program, TNCs first need to identify the appli-
cable child labor standards and establish measures implementing these 
standards in TNCs’ practices and supplier reviews. As the Gap Inc. inci-
dent demonstrates,218 TNCs also need to develop procedures governing 
their response to child labor incidents. 
A. Identifying and Implementing Applicable Standards  
As the analysis of treaties and conventions pertaining to child labor 
shows, three categories of child labor violate international law219: the 
unconditional worst forms of child labor,220 “hazardous work,”221 and 
employment of children under a minimum age (which may be set be-
tween fifteen and twelve, depending on the States’ international obliga-
tions and domestic regulation).222 Based on the definitions of these catego-
ries, the bonded child labor allegedly involved in the Gap Inc. incident 
should fall under the realm of the unconditional worst forms of child labor. 
The engagement of children in the application of pesticides and fertilizers 
without protective equipment, as alleged in Bridgestone,223 may violate 
international law as a practice exposing children to hazardous substances. 
This shows that despite the fact that international child labor standards 
set the outer limits of permissible labor practices involving youth, TNCs 
may confront situations where the international standards are violated. 
To comply with these standards, TNCs should implement more strin-
gent screening and monitoring measures. The initial supplier screening 
should extend beyond the inspection of the suppliers’ records and pre-
mises. Record review or a single visit to the supplier’s factory would not 
reveal, for instance, that children at the factory use their relatives’ em-
ployee numbers to appear on the books as adult workers or that the sup-
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plier may keep a second set of records, which easily “bamboozle”224 
TNCs. To avoid this, TNCs can use accounting and social monitoring 
firms experienced in evaluating supply-chain risk and compliance with 
child labor standards.225 The contract with the supplier should address 
this concern and include the supplier’s on-going certification of com-
pliance with international and local child labor laws226 and a provision 
giving TNCs’ representatives, such as social monitoring firms, the right 
to inspect the supplier’s premises and records at any time without prior 
notice to the supplier. 
TNCs or their representatives should conduct follow-up visits to the 
supplier’s factory. To that end, TNCs should maintain a current list of all 
production sites of its suppliers. For instance, the policy of IKEA, an in-
ternational furniture and home products franchise,227 requires suppliers to 
disclose the locations of all production sites.228 This policy should extend 
to the suppliers’ subcontractors as well. In order to ensure the accuracy 
of information on child labor compliance that the suppliers provide to the 
TNCs’ headquarters, TNCs may engage local unions in the monitoring 
process.229 TNCs may arrange training sessions for the suppliers’ workers 
to increase their awareness with respect to child labor issues. To improve 
incident reporting, TNCs may establish a hotline or other anonymous 
reporting system, such as an independent worker survey.230 These meas-
ures will ensure that the TNC’s management is aware of the TNC’s and 
its suppliers’ labor practices and can timely respond to any potential vi-
olations. 
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B. Responding to Child Labor Incidents 
When a TNC discovers child labor incidents in its own or its suppliers’ 
labor practices, the TNC’s remedial and follow-up measures should take 
into consideration children’s rights, such as the right to be free from ex-
ploitation231 and the right to survival and an adequate standard of living.232 
To balance these rights, the TNC should engage the affected children in a 
discussion about possible solutions to the problem233 and assure that the 
best interests of the child are given a primary consideration.234 Following 
this approach, TNCs may find that an instant severing of ties with a non-
compliant supplier or immediate dismissal of children from the 
workplace without creation of any alternatives to work may not, on bal-
ance, benefit the children. 
While under certain circumstances, withdrawal and dismissal may be a 
justified measure, it may not constitute a sound policy if applied alone 
and without a case-by-case determination. Admittedly, withdrawal from 
a relationship with a noncompliant supplier or removal of children from 
work may be perceived as mitigating the TNC’s potential liability and 
deterring future noncompliance on the part of other suppliers. According 
to Gap Inc., for example, in 2006, it severed ties with twenty-three non-
compliant factories.235 TNCs, however, are increasingly recognizing the 
limitations of this approach. 
The solution to the child labor problem should take into consideration 
the best interests of the child and focus on creating meaningful alternatives 
for children dismissed from work. The apparel and accessories retailer 
H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB (“H&M”),236 for instance, reports that 
when it discovers “underage workers” at its supplier’s site, H&M, in co-
operation with the supplier, contacts the family of the affected child and 
seeks a solution in the child’s best interests.237 One such solution has 
been allowing the child to continue education and paying wages to the 
child’s family during the study period until the child reaches the appro-
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priate age.238 Similarly, to address the child labor issue at its suppliers’ 
plants, Levi Strauss & Co., a multinational apparel company,239 made a 
decision to pay for the children’s education and school supplies until 
they reach a minimum age when they would be offered a job at the 
plant.240 These capacity-building measures, providing resources and 
creating opportunities for the implementation of child labor standards in 
the local communities,241 serve the goals of child labor abolition more 
effectively than mere dismissal of child laborers from work. 
Development of capacity-building measures presents a fertile ground 
for creative solutions. In rural areas in developing countries, for instance, 
children often have to walk long distances to get to school,242 and simply 
providing basic transportation may increase the chances that these child-
ren will continue attending school, as opposed to joining the workforce 
too early. In identifying these solutions, TNCs may partner up with 
NGOs that have experience in capacity building. Starbucks Corporation, 
an international coffee retailer and coffee-house chain,243 for example, 
partnered with Save the Children USA, an international relief and devel-
opment organization, in bringing bilingual education to Mayan commun-
ities in Guatemala,244 which will expand the employment prospects for 
children in these communities. 
Although these measures increase the TNCs’ immediate cost of doing 
business, such cost is unlikely to be prohibitive. Generally, compliance 
programs incur costs, but are necessary for the business in order to avoid 
litigation, regulatory, and reputational risks. Additionally, by operating 
or otherwise doing business in jurisdictions with cheaper labor (where 
incidents of child labor are more likely) TNCs already reduce their labor 
costs and reap other benefits of globalization, a process that “has gener-
ated vast fortunes” for TNCs.245 The cost-benefit analysis of the measures 
addressing the child labor problem should take into account this relative 
reduction in overall costs, as well as other factors related to economic 
disparities between developed and developing countries such as the rela-
tive cost of living. The National Labor Committee estimates that an extra 
payment of twenty-five cents per garment paid by U.S. retailers to Ban-
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gladeshi vendors would provide the Bangladeshi economy with assis-
tance eight times exceeding the current U.S. aid,246 and thus, create new 
economic opportunities. In return, capacity-building measures will have 
a positive long-term effect on these communities, which will benefit the 
TNCs by developing the future workforce. 
CONCLUSION 
TNCs are increasingly becoming aware of the litigation and reputa-
tional risks posed by the use of child labor in TNCs’ and their suppliers’ 
international operations. There are hardly any “quick fixes”247 in this area 
because child labor issues are rooted in social and economic problems 
such as the lack of resources and opportunities. In developing countries, 
children have to work to support themselves and their families, and thus, 
child labor is a problem of development rather than merely an issue of 
corporate misfeasance. This understanding is important for instilling the 
need for TNCs to take measures that anticipate and address potential 
child labor incidents. Using the guidance provided in treaties pertaining 
to working youth, TNCs should approach child labor proactively, resist 
distancing themselves from this problem, and embrace the opportunity to 
create meaningful alternatives for child laborers. 
Anna A. Kornikova* 
                                                                                                             
 246. National Labor Committee, http://www.nlcnet.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
 247. ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOR 224 (Nelien Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 
2000). 
 *  J.D. Candidate and Fellow at the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of Interna-
tional Business Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. and M.A., summa cum laude, Ivanovo 
State University, Russia. I thank Professor Maryellen Fullerton for her guidance and 
comments on prior drafts of the Note. I am also grateful to the staff of the Brooklyn Jour-
nal of International Law for assistance in preparing this Note for publication. The views 
expressed in this Note and any errors or omissions are my own. I dedicate this Note to my 
parents. 
